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1 Introduction
In this paper we set up a general framework for analysing block ciphers. In
this framework the plaintext and ciphertext spaces are partitioned into a
number of classes. We consider the probabilities of a plaintext in a given
plaintext class being encrypted to a ciphertext in a given ciphertext class
under different keys. For a judicious choice of partitions of plaintext and
ciphertext spaces, these probabilities give a partition of the key space into
key classes which allows the technique of likelihood estimation to be used
to find the key class of the true key. We explain this idea more fully in
Section 2 and show how it applies to iterated block ciphers in Section 3. In
the rest of the paper we show how the recent cryptanalytic techniques of
S-box pairs analysis, linear crytanalysis, differential cryptanalysis and linear
structures fit naturally into this framework, so providing a comparison of
these techniques. Finally, in Section 8, we see how this method can be used
to show a cryptographic weakness of the SAFER [14] block cipher.
2 Statistical Estimation of the Key
We consider a block cipher to consist of a finite set of plaintexts M , a finite
set of ciphertexts C and a finite set {fk|k ∈ K} of invertible functions from
M onto C indexed by a set of keys K. The plaintext set M , the ciphertext
set C, the key set K and the set of invertible functions {fk :M → C} are all
public. The ciphertext c corresponding to the plaintext m under a particular
private key k∗ is then
c = fk∗(m).
The cryptanalyst’s task is to find the particular key k∗ given some information
about a number of corresponding plaintext–ciphertext pairs. In particular, if
the plaintexts are known, then we have a known plaintext attack, and if the
plaintexts can be chosen by the cryptanalyst then we have a chosen plaintext
attack.
We use the following framework to model the cryptanalyst’s knowledge of
the plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts. Let φ :M → X be a function
from the plaintext set M onto a set X and ψ : C → Y a function from
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the ciphertext set C onto a set Y . We call φ and ψ partition functions.
The functions φ and ψ partition the plaintext and ciphertext spaces into
equivalence classes indexed by the elements of X and Y respectively, and it
is convenient to think of X and Y as sets of equivalence classes of M and
C. Suppose that the cryptanalyst observes a pair (x, y), where x = φ(m) is
the result of applying φ to some plaintext m and y = ψ(c) is the result of
applying ψ to the ciphertext c = fk∗(m) obtained by enciphering m under
the true key k∗. Thus (x, y) is a pair of plaintext–ciphertext equivalence
classes, which the cryptanalyst uses to estimate the true key k∗.
We show how the true key k∗ can be estimated using the statistical tech-
nique of maximum likelihood estimation, as described in any textbook on
statistical inference, for example Silvey [23]. Let Pk[(x, y)] denote the proba-
bility that plaintext class x and ciphertext class y occur with key k. Pk[(., .)]
defines a probability mass function on the set of possible plaintext and ci-
phertext classes X×Y parameterised by elements of the key set K. However
we can regard P.[(x, y)] as a function on the key set K which is parameterised
by elements of the set of possible plaintext and ciphertext classes X×Y . This
function is known as the likelihood function L[(x, y); k] of the key k corre-
sponding to the data (x, y), and it is a measure of the plausibility that k is
the true key k∗ after we have observed the data (x, y). Thus we have
L[(x, y); k] = Pk[(x, y)],
and L[(x, y); k] = log(L[(x, y); k]) = log(Pk[(x, y)]),
where L[(x, y); k] is the log–likelihood function. For any fixed k, we can think
of the likelihood function L[(x, y); k] as a random variable whose distribution
is determined by the true distribution on the plaintext–ciphertext classes
(given by the true key k∗). Thus we can define the expected value of the
log–likelihood function at key k as
θ(k) = E {L[(x, y); k]} = E {logPk [(x, y)]} .
The following theorem, which we state in terms of plaintext and ciphertext
classes, is a standard result for log–likelihood functions.
Theorem 1 [23]: For all keys k ∈ K, θ(k) ≤ θ(k∗) with equality if and only
if Pk[(x, y)] = Pk∗ [(x, y)] for every plaintext–ciphertext class pair (x, y).
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Theorem 1 states that θ(k) attains its maximum at k∗, and if the dis-
tributions corresponding to different keys on the plaintext–ciphertext classes
are different, then k∗ is unique. In any case, we can define an equivalence
relation on the key space K in which two keys are equivalent if they have
the same distribution on the plaintext–ciphertext classes, and then estimate
the unique key class which maximises the likelihood. Let σ : K → Z be a
partition function from the key space K onto a set Z such that σ(k) = σ(k′)
if and only if L[(x, y); k] = L[(x, y); k′] for all (x, y). Z can be regarded as
a set of key equivalence classes induced by the likelihood function. We can
thus define the likelihood function L[(x, y); z] of the key class z corresponding
to the data (x, y). The expected value of the log–likelihood function at key
class z is then given by
θ(z) = E {L[(x, y); z]} = E {log(Pz [(x, y)])} ,
where Pz[(x, y)] = Pk[(x, y)] for any k ∈ K for which σ(k) = z. Theorem 1
shows that θ is uniquely maximised by z∗ = σ(k∗), the true key class.
Suppose now that we have N pairs of plaintext m = (m1, · · · ,mN) with
corresponding ciphertexts c = (c1, · · · , cN) that give plaintext classes x =
(x1, · · · , xN) and ciphertext classes y = (y1, · · · , yN) respectively. The joint
likelihood function is given by
L[(x,y); k] =
N∏
i=1
Pk[(xi, yi)],
so the joint log–likelihood function is given by
L[(x,y); k] =
N∑
i=1
L[(xi, yi); k] =
N∑
i=1
log(Pk[(xi, yi)]).
We propose to estimate the true key k∗ from the data (x,y) by the method
of maximum likelihood, so we have the following definition.
Definition: A maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of the true key k∗ is any
k ∈ K for which L[(x,y); k] or equivalently L[(x,y); k] is maximal.
We can express θ(k) in terms of expected value of the joint log–likelihood
function since
E
{
1
N
L[(x,y); k]
}
= E {log(Pk[(x1, y1)])} = θ(k).
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Thus, from Theorem 1, the expected value of the joint log–likelihood function
is maximised by the true key k∗. If we define the key partition function σ :
K → Z as above, then we can define the joint likelihood function L[(x,y); z]
of the key class z corresponding to the data (x,y). The expected value of
the joint log–likelihood function at key class z is given by
E
{
1
N
L[(x,y); z]
}
= E {log(Pz[(x1, y1)])} = θ(z),
and so is uniquely maximised by the true key class z∗.
We now give a brief description of the properties of the maximum likeli-
hood estimate that make it the optimal estimate of the key.
Definition: Suppose {zˆn} is a sequence of estimates for z∗. Then zˆn is
consistent if zˆn → z∗ (in the appropriate stochastic sense).
Theorem 2 [23]: The maximum likelihood estimate of z∗ is consistent.
Sketch Proof: We are essentially estimating θ(z) with 1
N
L[(x,y); z]. The
law of large numbers ensures that for large N and most (x,y), 1
N
L[(x,y); z]
is near θ(z). If z˜N is the maximum likelihood estimate of z
∗ based on N
plaintext–ciphertext classes, then this shows z˜N → z∗ (in the appropriate
stochastic sense).2
Definition: A statistic t is sufficient for z∗ if the distribution of a sample
(x,y) given the value of t((x,y)) does not depend on z∗.
Equivalently, t is a sufficient statistic for z∗ if the distribution within an
equivalence class of the partition induced by t is independent of z∗. Thus
the distribution of t contains all the information relevant to estimating z∗.
A necessary and sufficient condition for t to be sufficient is given by the
following factorisation theorem.
Theorem 3 [23]: t is a sufficient statistic for the family {Pz[(., .)]|z ∈ Z}
if and only if Pz[(x, y)] can be expressed as Pz[(x, y)] = gz[t((x, y))]h((x, y)),
where h does not depend on z.
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Definition: A statistic t is minimal–sufficient for z∗ if the partition induced
by t contains every other sufficient partition.
Equivalently, t is a minimal–sufficient statistic for z∗ if it is a function of
every other sufficient statistic for z∗. Therefore a minimal–sufficient statistic
contains the minimum information relevant to estimating z∗. The following
theorem concerning the maximum likelihood estimator is a corollary of the
above theorem.
Theorem 4 [23]: The maximum likelihood estimate is a function of a
minimal–sufficient statistic.
Thus the maximum likelihood estimate depends only on the minimal
relevant information in the sample. Hence the maximum likelihood estimate
of the key is the optimal estimate of the key since it is both consistent and
minimal–sufficient.
It is often convenient to express the likelihood in a different form. Suppose
P (x) denotes the probability that plaintext class x occurs, then we can write
the likelihood function in the form
L[(x, y); k] = Pk[(x, y)] = Pk(y|x)P (x),
where Pk(y|x) denotes the probability that a plaintext in class x is encrypted
to a ciphertext in class y under key k. In any particular attack, the dis-
tribution of the plaintexts induces a distribution on the plaintext classes.
Thus in a ciphertext–only attack where we had some information about the
plaintexts, for example they were in ASCII or a natural language, we could
use this information to calculate the values of P (x). For many known plain-
text attack, the distribution of plaintexts can be assumed to be uniform,
and so if the plaintext classes all have equal size, then P (x) is a constant
and L[(x, y); k] ∝ Pk(y|x). For a chosen plaintext attack, P (x) is essentially
chosen by the cryptanalyst. In many attacks, the plaintexts are all chosen to
be in one class, in which case we have a likelihood function L[y; k] = Pk[y].
We saw above how the likelihood function defines an equivalence rela-
tion on the key space K in which two keys are equivalent if their likelihood
functions are identical. Therefore to find the key by maximum likelihood es-
timation, we perform a “divide and conquer” cryptanalytic attack. By using
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the plaintext and ciphertext classes, we first find the equivalence class of the
key space which maximises the likelihood function. We then search this key
class using the plaintexts and ciphertexts for the true key. The complexity
of calculating the likelihood for a general pair of plaintext–ciphertext classes
determines the computational complexity of finding the true key class, as the
joint likelihood can easily be calculated from this. The number of plaintext–
ciphertext pairs determines the error probability of estimating the true key
class. The complexity of the cryptanalysis is then determined by the above
factors and the sizes of the key classes.
For a simple example of a cryptanalytic attack consider a known plaintext
exhaustive key search. We define φ and ψ both to be identity functions, so
φ(m) = m and ψ(c) = c. Thus
L[(m, c); k] = Pk[(c|m)]P (m) =
{
P (m) if fk(m) = c
0 otherwise,
so the maximum value of the likelihood function distinguishes precisely those
keys which transform the known plaintext m to the known ciphertext c.
In this example, it is necessary to perform an encryption or decryption
for each key in order to evaluate the likelihood function, so that evaluating
the likelihood requires |K| encryptions. However, in various recent successful
cryptanalytic attacks, defects in certain block ciphers have been discovered
which allow φ and ψ to be chosen in such a way that it is possible to find
the key class that maximises the likelihood function with an acceptable error
probability and then search this key class in order to determine the key more
quickly than would be expected in an exhaustive key search.
For certain block ciphers it is also possible to maximise or calculate the
likelihood function very efficiently. Andelman and Reeds [1] [2] considered
such a situation for both rotor machines (stream ciphers) and SP networks
(block ciphers). For an SP network with a small number of rounds and an
n-bit key k = (k1, · · · , kn), the likelihood function for k is well–approximated
by a product of functions each involving only one key bit as
L[(m, c); k] ≈
n∏
i=1
li[(m, c); ki].
Andelman and Reeds showed how to find the true key bits ki by the fast max-
imisation of this product. For a general block cipher (including SP networks
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with many rounds) such an approximation of the likelihood does not hold.
Biham’s related key chosen plaintext cryptanalysis [4] exploits key scheduling
defects in certain ciphers. In the likelihood framework, this corresponds to
sets of related keys having related likelihood functions given related plain-
texts. The calculation of the likelihood function can thus be carried out more
efficiently.
Maximum likelihood estimation of the true key class can also be thought
of as a key partition inducing a partition on the plaintext–ciphertext classes,
and this is the usual statistical formulation of such problems. Let σ : K → Z
be a function from the key set K onto a set Z, so σ partitions K into equiv-
alence classes indexed by elements of Z. Suppose we now wish to estimate
the value of z∗ = σ(k∗), the equivalence class of k∗ the true key, given some
plaintext–ciphertext data (m, c). The maximum likelihood estimate of z∗,
which is optimal in the sense described above, is necessarily a function of a
minimal–sufficient statistic of the data (m, c). This minimal–sufficient statis-
tic gives the minimal partition of the plaintext–ciphertext space(M×C) that
allows the estimation of σ(k∗). The minimal partition enables us to define
optimal partition functions φ :M → X and ψ : C → Y .
We conclude this Section by discussing other ways of viewing likelihood
estimation for block cipher keys. The problem of estimating the true key k∗
has a Bayesian formulation. If the cryptanalyst has a prior distribution on
the set of keys, then Bayes’ Theorem provides a method for estimating the
key. If we have a plaintext class x and a ciphertext class y, then we can use
an inference form of Bayes’ Theorem [23]:
Bayes’ Theorem: Suppose p(.) is the prior mass function on the elements
of the key space K, p(.|(x, y)) is the posterior mass function on the elements
of the key space K given the data (x, y), and L[(x,y);k] is the likelihood of
the key k corresponding to the data (x, y), then
p(k|(x, y)) ∝ L[(x, y); k]p(k).
Usually each key is equally likely, so the prior mass function p(.) is con-
stant. In this case Theorem 1 shows that the posterior probability p(k∗|(x, y))
is maximal, or equivalently k∗ is a mode of the posterior distribution. This
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is a standard result of Bayesian statistics, but whatever the prior distribu-
tion, the mode of the posterior is the Bayes’ estimate with respect to the
zero-one loss function. Note that if we have many corresponding pairs of
plaintext and ciphertext classes, the posterior distribution obtained by using
a joint likelihood for many pairs is the same as that obtained by iteratively
calculating posterior distributions one pair at a time and using them as prior
distributions for the next iteration. The Bayesian approach has often been
used in the analysis of block and stream ciphers both explicitly, for example
[18] [3] [8], and implicitly in “key ranking” techniques, for example [13] [16].
The problem of testing whether a key class is the true key class can
also be expressed in terms of hypothesis testing, another routine statistical
technique [23]. Hypothesis testing has been used by Brynielsson [6] to find
stream cipher keys. Suppose we wish to test the null hypothesis H0 : z = z
∗
that z is the true key class z∗ against the alternative hypothesis HA : z 6= z∗
that z is not the true key class. The likelihood ratio test is based on the ratio
λ ((x,y)) = sup
z 6=z∗
{
L[(x,y); z]
L[(x,y); z∗]
}
.
Intuitively, we would reject the null hypothesis H0 if the ratio λ ((x,y)) is too
large. Indeed the likelihood ratio test has a critical region for rejecting H0
of the form {(x,y)|λ((x,y)) > c}, where c is fixed by the error probability
α = P [λ((x,y)) > c|z = z∗] of rejecting the true key class z∗. Such a test is
called a test of size α. A full analysis of this likelihood test would involve
the evaluation of the power function pi : HA → [0, 1], which is defined by
pi(z) = 1−P [ Accept z is true key class|z ∈ HA] ,
so pi(z) is the probability of rejecting the false key class z. We should like
to choose a test of size α that is optimal in some sense over all tests of
size α. In the case, when HA consists of a single key class, that is HA is
a simple hypothesis, the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [23] shows that a test
based on a critical region {(x,y)|λ(x,y) > c}, where c is determined by
α = P (λ(x,y) > c), is the most powerful test of size α. Even when HA is a
composite hypothesis, for most cryptographic purposes testing H0 against HA
is equivalent to a one–sided test involving normal distributions with different
means. For such tests, the likelihood ratio test is uniformly most powerful,
that is it has maximal power pi(z) over all tests of size α for every z ∈ HA.
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Note that we may be able to perform a hypothesis test more efficiently by
performing a sequential likelihood ratio test [23].
3 Iterated Block Ciphers
Most block ciphers are constructed by iterating a relatively simple crypto-
graphic function a number of times. Consider such an n-round block cipher.
For such a cipher M = C and the ith round transformation under a key
k is an invertible function from the (i − 1)th-round message space to the
ith-round message space, which we denote by αi(k) : M → M . Thus for a
plaintext m0 and key k, we can regard the encryption process as producing
a sequence of message states m0,m1, · · · ,mn, where mn is the ciphertext,
and mi = mi−1αi(k). Thus the encryption function α(k) : M → M from
plaintext to ciphertext is given by
α(k) =
n∏
i=1
αi(k).
For such an iterated block cipher, we generalise the approach outlined in
the previous Section, by partitioning all the ith-round message spaces (i =
1, · · · , n) as well as the plaintext and ciphertext spaces. For each i = 0, · · ·n,
let φi : M → Yi be a function from the message space M onto a set Yi. The
partition function φi partitions the i
th-round message space into equivalence
classes indexed by the elements of Yi (i = 0, · · · , n).
Suppose now that we have a sequence of message states m0,m1, · · ·mn
obtained by encrypting under the key k. We can then obtain a sequence
of message classes y0, y1, · · · , yn, where yi = φi(mi). This sequence can be
regarded as a realisation of a random process on Y0, Y1, · · · , Yn. Suppose the
matrix of transition probabilities from Yi−1 to Yi under key k is Qi(k). The
entries of the transition matrix Qi(k) can be easily calculated as
(Qi(k))yi−1,yi = Pk (Yi = yi|Yi−1 = yi−1) =
|{m ∈ yi−1|mαi(k) ∈ yi}|
|yi−1| .
We wish to calculate the matrix Q(k) of transition probabilities from the
plaintext classes Y0 to the ciphertext classes Yn. If the random process on
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the message classes Y0, · · · , Yn under key k is well–approximated by a first
order Markov process, this matrix Q(k) is given by the product
Q(k) =
n∏
i=1
Qi(k).
A first order Markov random process is one in which the distribution of the
ith message class yi conditional on all the previous message classes yi−1, · · · , y0
is identical to the distribution of yi conditional on the most recent message
class yi−1. As part of the modelling approach, we make the assumption that
the random process on the message classes Y0, · · · , Yn under key k is well–
approximated by a first order Markov process. For the S-box pairs analysis
considered in Section 4, this is shown to be a valid assumption [8], whereas
it has been implicitly assumed in the other cryptanalyses we consider. This
assumption could be justified empirically in the different cryptanalyses we
consider, but we give the following heuristic justification. The round partition
functions used in the various cryptanalyses are algebraic homomorphisms, so
the set of round message classes form an algebraic quotient space. The round
functions contain transformations which are highly non–homomorphic with
respect to these quotient spaces. Therefore the algebraic structure of an
(i− 1)th round message class yi−1 is not “inherited” by an ith message class
yi, that is the elements of yi−1 are sufficiently “randomised” within yi. In
cases where the round functions are partially homomorphic with respect to
these quotient spaces, for example the differential analysis of DES discussed
in Section 6, the“randomisation” property can often be restored by using the
partial homomorphism to construct a finer partition.
We can thus calculate the likelihood function as above with φ = φ0 and
ψ = φn since the relevant entry of Q(k) gives the probability Pk(y|x). For
such ciphers, the equivalence classes of the key space K induced by the
likelihood function are indexed by the set of matrices {Q(k)|k ∈ K}, that is
k and k′ belong to the key class if Q(k) = Q(k′).
4 S-Box Pairs Cryptanalysis of DES
For a general example of a cryptanalysis that can be thought of in the above
framework, consider the cryptanalysis of DES [20] by Davies and Murphy
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[8] using pairs of S-boxes. Consider a pair of adjacent DES S-boxes with
respective 6-bit inputs a1, · · · , a6 and b1, · · · , b6. Over all 212 possible inputs
to this pair of DES S-boxes, each possible 8-bit output occurs equally often
(16 times). However, the expansion phase of DES (E) means that the values
of a5⊕b1 and a6⊕b2 are determined solely by the key. If we fix these bits, then
over the remaining possible 210 inputs, we obtain a non-uniform distribution
of the 28 possible outputs. Furthermore this non-uniform distribution has one
of two forms depending on the value of a5⊕a6⊕b1⊕b2, the XOR of the middle
four bits. To calculate the distribution of the XOR of the outputs of n pairs
of S-boxes given random inputs we have to calculate the n-fold convolution of
this distribution with itself, and this distribution is also one of only two non-
uniform distributions depending on the total XOR of a5 ⊕ a6 ⊕ b1 ⊕ b2 from
the input of each pair of S-boxes. From a plaintext–ciphertext pair it is easy
to obtain a realisation of the XOR of the outputs of 8 pairs of S-boxes with
approximately random inputs. With many such plaintext–ciphertext pairs,
we can construct an estimate of the XOR of all the common key bits. We
can do this for all 8 pairs of S-boxes on both the left and right halves of the
cipher, so this potentially gives us 16 bits of key information. However only
S-box pair 7,8 gives us this information faster than an exhaustive key search,
so this attack only yields two bits of key information. We show how this
cryptanalysis can be viewed in the likelihood framework. For the purposes
of this cryptanalysis of DES, it is convenient to ignore the initial and final
permutations of DES, IP and IP−1, as there is no loss of generality. We
actually analyse a variant of the DES cryptosystem given by Desmedt [9],
which we call EXPDES. This variant is a block cipher which can be regarded
as DES with 48-bit registers rather than 32-bit registers. If E, S and P denote
the usual expansion, S-box and permutation of the encryption function f of
DES, then we can define T : Z482 → Z482 by T = S.P.E (with maps on the
right). EXPDES has message space M = Z962 , and we denote the ith-round
message by (li, ri) for li, ri ∈ Z482 . An encryption round of EXPDES is given
by
(l2i+1, r2i+1) = (l2i ⊕ (r2i ⊕ k2i+1)T, r2i) [i = 0, · · · , 7]
(l2i, r2i) = (l2i−1, r2i−1 ⊕ (l2i−1 ⊕ k2i)T ) [i = 1, · · · , 8],
where ki is the usual 48-bit i
th-round DES subkey. EXPDES encrypts plain-
text (l0, r0) to (l16, r16), and by analogy with DES, the ciphertext is (r16, l16).
Note that if we encrypt a 64-bit message by first expanding both 32-bit halves
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to 48-bits using the expansion function E, then encrypting with EXPDES
and finally “unexpanding” the 96-bits to a 64-bit cryptogram using E, this
is equivalent to encrypting the original 64-bit message using DES.
At any particular stage, EXPDES is divided into a left and a right reg-
ister, and we regard each of them as a 48-dimensional vector space over Z2.
Let pi denote the projection of this space onto an 8-dimensional subspace
corresponding to the 8-bit output of the adjacent pair of S-boxes after the
functions P and E have been applied. Let I1, · · · , I6 and J1, · · · , J6 denote
the unit vectors which have a 1 in the appropriate position corresponding to
the 6-bit inputs to a pair of adjacent S-boxes, and let ρ denote the projec-
tion of the 48-dimensional space onto the 1-dimensional subspace generated
by I5 ⊕ I6 ⊕ J1 ⊕ J2. Note that the linear transformation Eρ from a 32-
dimensional to a 1-dimensional space satisfies Eρ = 0, and so the non-linear
transformation Tρ of the 48-dimensional space satisfies Tρ = SPEρ = 0.
We are going to use the projection pi to track the 8-bit XOR of the output of
the adjacent pair of S-boxes and ρ to track the fixed value a5 ⊕ a6 ⊕ b1 ⊕ b2
given above. Let Yi be the 9-dimensional vector space which is the direct
sum Im(ρ)⊕ Im(pi) and define partition functions φi : Xi → Yi by
φi ((li, ri)) = (liρ, ripi), [i = 0, · · · , 16].
The encryption transformation from the (2i)th-round to the (2i+ 1)th-round
leaves the message classes unaltered since,
φ2i+1 ((l2i+1, r2i+1)) = (l2i+1ρ, r2i+1pi)
= (l2iρ⊕ (k2i+1 ⊕ r2i)Tρ, r2ipi)
= (l2iρ, r2ipi) = φ2i ((l2i, r2i)) [i = 0, · · · , 7],
which means that the transition matrix is the identity matrix.
The encryption transformation from the (2i − 1)th-round to the (2i)th-
round permutes the message classes according to the output of the two ad-
jacent S-boxes. We have
φ2i ((l2i, r2i)) = (l2iρ, r2ipi)
= (l2i−1ρ, r2i−1pi ⊕ (k2i ⊕ l2i−1)Tpi)
= φ2i−1 (l2i−1, r2i−1)⊕ (0, (k2i ⊕ l2i−1)Tpi) [i = 1, · · · , 8]
giving a block diagonal transition matrix of the form(
M0(k2i) 0
0 M1(k2i)
)
,
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where the subscript denotes the value of l2i−1ρ. Tpi is the output of the pair of
adjacent S-boxes, and given that the value of l2i−1ρ is known, the distribution
of Tpi depends on k2iρ. It can be shown [8] (as each DES S-box consists of
four permutations) that the (28 × 28) matrices M.(k2i) can be expressed as
M0(k2i) = E + (−1)k2iρW, M1(k2i) = E − (−1)k2iρW,
where E denotes the 28× 28 matrix with entries 2−8 and W = (wij) has row
and column sum zero, “constant diagonals” (ie. w(i,j)⊕(d,d) = w(i,j) for all
d ∈ Z82), and is easily calculated. Thus we can write
M(k2iρ) =
(
E + (−1)k2iρW 0
0 E − (−1)k2iρW
)
as the transition matrix from the (2i−1)th-round to the (2i)th-round message
classes.
The random process on round message classes is well–approximated by a
Markov process [8], so the overall transition matrix is well-approximated by
the product of the round transition matrices. Now EW = WE = 0, so for
any n1, · · · , nj = 0, 1 we have
j∏
i=1
M(ni) =
(
E + (−1)⊕niW l 0
0 E + (−1)⊕ni(−W )l
)
.
Thus we can write the transition matrix from plaintext classes to ciphertext
classes as
Q(k) =
8∏
i=1
M(k2iρ) =M
(
⊕8i=1(k2iρ)
)
=M
(
(⊕8i=1k2i)ρ
)
so Q(k) =
(
E + (−1)sW 8 0
0 E + (−1)sW 8
)
, where s = (⊕8i=1k2i)ρ
Our analysis of DES has used an expanded form of DES, EXPDES. How-
ever, the generalisation of DES to EXPDES means that we use plaintext–
ciphertext classes corresponding to the “top left” block of Q(k), giving a
transition matrix between plaintext and ciphertext classes of E + (−1)sW 8,
where s = (⊕8i=1k2i)ρ. We can thus define two classes on the key space, de-
pending on the value of (⊕8i=1k2i)ρ, and, since we need only to discriminate
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between two cases, we can use a likelihood ratio hypothesis test for two sim-
ple hypothesis as described in Section 2. The two approaches are equivalent
since this hypothesis test “selects” the value of (⊕8i=1k2i)ρ giving the higher
value of the likelihood function. We can also define a function
φ : Y0 × Y16 → Y = Im(pi)
from the plaintext–ciphertext classes onto a set Y by addition of the plaintext
and ciphertext classes, so
φ ((y0, y16)) = y0 ⊕ y16 = (r0 ⊕ r16)pi.
This defines a partition of the plaintext–ciphertext classes into equivalence
classes on which the likelihood function is constant for each key, since E +
(−1)sW 8 has constant diagonals. This partition corresponds to the minimal–
sufficient statistic for estimating s = (⊕8i=1k2i)ρ.
5 Linear Cryptanalysis
In this Section, we show how the technique of linear cryptanalysis applied by
Matsui and Yamagishi to FEAL [17], and by Matsui to DES [15] [16], can be
viewed in the likelihood framework. Linear cryptanalysis is very similar to the
analysis of S-box pairs analysed in the previous Section. Linear cryptanalysis
essentially considers projections onto linear (1-dimensional) subspaces, rather
than the projection onto the 9-dimensional subspace used in the previous
Section. In our analysis, we consider the analysis of DES given by Matsui
[15], and for consistency we use the notation of that paper. We regard the
left and right registers as a 32-dimensional binary vector space Z322 , and for
X ∈ Z322 we define X[i] to be the projection onto the ith position of X and
X[i1, · · · , ij] = X[i1]⊕ · · · ⊕X[ij].
In the annex to Matsui [15] the following equation is given
PH [7, 18, 24]⊕ PL[12, 16]⊕ CH [15]⊕ CL[7, 18, 24, 29, 27, 28, 30, 31] = k
where PH , PL, CH , CL are the plaintext left and right halves and the cipher-
text left and right halves respectively, and k is the sum of a certain collection
of key bits. This equation holds with probability 1
2
−p, where p = 1.49×2−24.
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In the notation of Section 2, if we define the partition function φ on the plain-
text by φ((PH , PL)) = PH [7, 18, 24] ⊕ PL[12, 16], and the partition function
ψ on the ciphertext by ψ((CH , CL)) = CH [15]⊕CL[7, 18, 24, 29, 27, 28, 30, 31]
to be the ciphertext class, then the transition matrix between plaintext and
ciphertext classes is given by(
1
2
− (−1)kp 1
2
+ (−1)kp
1
2
+ (−1)kp 1
2
− (−1)kp
)
.
This transition matrix can be calculated by using ith-round message classes as
explained in Section 3, and this is essentially how the probabilistic equation
given above was derived. We need to test whether k = 0 or k = 1. The
log–likelihood ratio statistic, Λ, for this test is given by
Λ = (N − 2n)4p for small p.
This is the statistic used by Matsui. Therefore we choose k = 0 if n < N
2
and
k = 1 otherwise. This gives, for example, for a one–sided test of size 0.0228,
a sample size N of 247 plaintext–ciphertexts pairs, the value given by [15].
Matsui [15] also gives another probabilistic equation, namely
PH [7, 18, 24]⊕ PL[12, 16]⊕ CH [15]⊕ CL[7, 18, 24, 29]⊕ F16(CL, k16)[15] = k,
where k is a certain sum of key bits and F16(CL, k16)[15] denotes the output of
the DES F function in bit position 15. This equation holds with probability
1
2
+ p, where p = 1.19 × 2−22. Since this probabilistic equation depends
on k and the 6 bits of K16 used as input to S-box 1, we now have the
potential to estimate 7 bits of key information. These are k∗, the true value
of k, and h∗, the 6 true key input bits of K16 to S-box 1 which affect the
value of F16(Cl, K16)[15]. This probabilistic equation can be derived using i
th-
round message classes as described in Section 3, with plaintext and ciphertext
classes defined by φ : Z642 → Z2 and ψ : Z642 → Z72 respectively, where
φ ((PH , PL)) = (PH [7, 18, 24]⊕ PL[12, 16]),
ψ ((CH , CL)) = (CH [15]⊕ CL[7, 18, 24, 29], C1L) ,
and C1L denotes the 6 input bits from CL to S-box 1. We can now estimate
the true key class (k∗, h∗) by likelihood estimation. Matsui’s [15] estimate of
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the true key class is the key class (k, h) which has the largest count for the
number of times the above equation holds.
In [16] Matsui improves the efficiency of this cryptanalysis by using the
technique of key ranking. In this technique, the key classes are ranked ac-
cording to their count for the number of times the equation holds. The key
classes are then tested in rank order. As mentioned in Section 2 this tech-
nique is the calculation of an empirical Bayesian posterior distribution on
the key classes.
Kaliski and Robshaw [12] describe a multiple approximations technique
which uses n linear approximations simultaneously. This corresponds to
defining the partition functions to be projections onto certain n-dimensional
subspaces rather than 1-dimensional ones.
6 Differential Cryptanalysis
In this Section, we show how differential cryptanalysis first described by
Biham and Shamir [5] and generalised by Lai, Massey and Murphy [13] can
be expressed in the likelihood framework. Suppose we have a block cipher
with message space M , and ith-round subkey ki ∈ M in which m0 is the
plaintext and mn is the ciphertext, and the i
th-round encryption is given by
mi = (mi−1 ¯ ki)T [i = 1 · · ·n],
for some invertible function T on the message space M , where (M,¯) is a
group. We note that, whilst many iterated block ciphers can be described
in this form, DES cannot because of the expansion phase (E). However
the expanded form of DES described in Section 4, EXPDES, does fit this
formulation, so results for DES can be obtained by analysing EXPDES.
We can define another (double) block cipher based on the original cipher
with message space A = M × M and key space K by running a pair of
encryptions in parallel. For this cipher the ith-round encryption is given by
(mi,m
′
i) =
(
(mi−1 ¯ ki)T, (m′i−1 ¯ ki)T
)
.
Thus we can define a group (A, ◦) = (M,¯) × (M,¯), an ith-round subkey
ki = (ki, ki) and an invertible function S on A such that for xi−1, xi ∈ A an
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encryption round can be defined by
xi = (xi−1 ◦ ki)S.
An ith-round differential can be regarded as a surjective function ψi : A =
M ×M → M on the ith-round message classes of the double cipher defined
by
ψi ((mi,m
′
i)) = mi ¯m′i−1.
Suppose now that ψi and ψi+1 were used as partition functions in a likelihood
cryptanalysis. We first note that for any constant d ∈M ,
ψi ((mi ¯ d,m′i ¯ d)) = (mi ¯ d)¯ (m′i ¯ d)−1 = mi ¯m′i−1 = ψi ((mi,m′i)) .
Thus, in particular, the introduction of a subkey ki = (ki, ki) to this double
cipher on A leaves the value of ψi unaltered. Hence the transition probabili-
ties between the ith-round and the (i+1)th-round message classes defined by
ψi and ψi+1 are key–independent. Biham and Shamir [5] term such differen-
tial classes characteristics. For many ciphers, though not EXPDES, it is a
reasonable assumption (as discussed in Section 3) that the random process on
the round differential classes forms a first order Markov processes. Thus we
can calculate key–independent transition probabilities between differential
characteristics several rounds apart.
If we defined all the partition functions φi (i = 0, · · · , n) to be the dif-
ferential functions ψi, we would obtain a key–independent transition matrix
between the plaintext classes and the ciphertext classes. Whilst this would
give us information about the correlation between plaintext and ciphertext
differentials, it would give no information about the key. Suppose we define
partition functions φi by
φi = ψi (Yi =M) i = 0, · · · , (n− l − 1),
φn−l = Indicator for D (Yn−l = {D,M \D}),
φi = Identity (Yi = A) i = (n− l + 1), · · ·n,
where D ⊂ M and φn−l((m,m′)) = D if and only if mi ¯m′i−1 ∈ D. With
these partition functions, we obtain a key–independent transition matrix
from the plaintext classes to the (n−l)th-round message classes. This enables
us to find a transition matrix depending on a small set of key classes for the
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transition from the (n − l)th-round message classes to the ciphertext. We
can use the likelihood estimation process outlined earlier to find the true key
class, and then search this class for the true key. In practice, for a differential
attack we would use a chosen plaintext attack by specifying a given plaintext
difference. This gives key–independent probabilities pD and 1 − pD for the
(n − l)th-round message classes D,M \D. The plaintext difference and the
set D would be chosen so as to maximise the transition probability pD. This
makes the likelihood estimation process more efficient, and may reduce the
number of key classes. In this case, if we observe the ciphertext y ∈ A, we
can write the likelihood and the log–likelihood function as
L[y; k] = Pk(y), L[y; k] = log (Pk(y)) .
If we observe N ciphertexts y = (y1, · · · yN), then the joint log–likelihood is
given by
L[y; k] =
N∑
i=1
logPk(yi).
We now show how some of the methods used in the recent differential attacks
may be regarded in the likelihood framework.
In order to simplify the following discussion, we assume that l = 1. This
corresponds to what Biham and Shamir call a 1R-attack. For a given plain-
text equivalence class (differential), the (n− 1)th-round message class D oc-
curs with probability pD, and the other (n− 1)th-round message class M \D
occurs with probability 1− pD. For y ∈ A, we can define
u(kn) = Pk∗ [ yS
−1 ◦ k−1n ∈ D ],
which can be expressed in terms of the following two probabilities,
q(kn) = P[ y ∈ D | y ◦ kn ∈ D ], and r(kn) = P[ y 6∈ D | y ◦ kn 6∈ D ].
If we let w = yS−1◦k∗−1n denote the true value of the (n−1)th-round message,
we have
u(kn) = Pk∗(yS
−1 ◦ k−1n ∈ D)
= Pk∗(w ◦ (k∗n ◦ k−1n ) ∈ D)
= P(w ◦ (k∗n ◦ k−1n ) ∈ D|w ∈ D)Pk∗(w ∈ D)
+P(w ◦ (k∗n ◦ k−1n ) ∈ D|w 6∈ D)Pk∗(w 6∈ D)
= pDq(k
∗
n ◦ k−1n ) + (1− pD)(1− r(k∗n ◦ k−1n )).
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Thus we have
E[Pk(yi)] = E[Pk(yi | yiS−1 ◦ k−1n ∈ D )]Pk∗(yiS−1 ◦ k−1n ∈ D)
+E[Pk(yi|yiS−1 ◦ k−1n 6∈ D)]Pk∗(yiS−1 ◦ k−1n 6∈ D)
=

u(kn)
|D| if yiS
−1 ◦ k−1n ∈ D
1−u(kn)
|M |−|D| if yiS
−1 ◦ k−1n /∈ D
,
and so the expected value of the joint log–likelihood for N ciphertexts y =
(y1, · · · , yN) is given by
E[L[y; k]] = ∑Ni=1E[logPk(yi)]
= E[mD(kn)] log
u(kn)
|D| + (N − E[mD(kn)]) log 1−u(kn)|M |−|D|
= N log 1−ukn|M |−|D| + E[mD(kn)] log
(
u(kn)
(1−u(kn))
(|M |−|D|)
|D|
)
,
wheremD(kn) is the number of times the (n−1)th-round message class occurs
by decrypting the ciphertexts under nth-round subkey kn.
For differential cryptanalyses |D| << |M |, u(k∗n) = pD, and we can usu-
ally make the simplifying assumption that for kn 6= k∗n, u(kn) ≈ |D||M | . Thus,
for k 6= k∗,
E[L[y; k]] ≈ −N log |M |,
whereas for the true key k∗,
E[L[y; k∗]] ≈ −N log |M |+ E[mD(k∗)] log
(
pD
(1− pD)
|M |
|D|
)
.
However E[mD(k)] is maximal when k = k
∗, so maximising mD(k) gives an
approximate maximum likelihood estimate.
Gilbert and Chasse´’s [11] differential analysis of FEAL-8 is one in which
the true key is found by calculating which key gives rise to a distribution
that best fits a theoretical distribution. We note that this attack is obtained
if we take φn−l = ψn−l in the above model.
Biham and Shamir [5] use mD(kn) to estimate the true key class. Their
estimate of the sample size is based on a signal to noise ratio (S/N). In
likelihood terms, this is the ratio of the likelihood under the true key class
to the average value of the likelihood. In the theory of statistical hypothesis
tests (outlined in Section 2), we consider the ratio of the likelihood under
20
the true key class to the largest likelihood under all the other key classes.
Thus the signal to noise ratio (S/N) does not allow for correlated counts for
incorrect key classes and so is an approximation which may underestimate the
sample size in situations where counts for different keys are highly correlated.
As we mentioned above, the random process on the differential classes
for EXPDES is not approximated by a first order Markov process. This is
because the invertible function S on the “double” cipher with message space
A is partially homomorphic (due to the DES S-boxes mapping 48 bits to
32) with respect to the differential classes. By using S to construct a finer
partition by projecting onto certain bit positions as well as the difference,
we obtain an approximate first order process. Biham and Shamir [5] termed
such partition functions for DES enhanced characteristics. The transition
probabilities between enhanced characteristics are therefore key–dependent,
but the analysis of enhanced characteristics is similar to that described above.
The probabilities used for ordinary characteristics for DES are averages across
keys of the probabilities of the enhanced characteristics.
7 Linear Structures
In a series of papers, Reeds and Manferdelli [21], Chaum and Evertse [7], and
Evertse [10] consider how to analyse a block cipher if the encryption function
has some partial linearity associated with it. The basic idea is to find linear or
affine transformations of the plaintext, ciphertext and key spaces respectively
such that the mapped ciphertext is a function of the mapped plaintext and
mapped key. If these transformations have less than full rank, then it may
be possible to cryptanalyse the smaller mapped cryptosystem and determine
a subspace of the key space containing the true key.
If a block cipher has this partial linearity, then we can define partition
functions based on the various linear or affine transformations and obtain
a set of key–dependent permutation matrices describing the transitions be-
tween the plaintext and ciphertext classes. In terms of the likelihood frame-
work, these attacks can be regarded as the special case when the transition
matrix is a permutation matrix. In this case the likelihood function only
takes the values zero or one and the algebraic structure may allow us to
evaluate the likelihood function quickly.
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The likelihood framework however allows us to relax the condition that
the transition matrices must be permutation matrices, and still enables us to
find the key. Thus for a general block cipher, when the partition functions
have been defined in terms of linear or affine transformations, we are really
considering probabilistic linear structures. This is certainly the case with
the three examples, S-box pairs, linear and differential cryptanalysis, that
are considered above. In the analysis of SAFER in the next Section, the
partition functions are based on a module homomorphism.
8 Analysis of the SAFER Block Cipher
In this Section, we consider the SAFER block cipher [14], and show that
viewing SAFER in the likelihood framework exposes a cryptographic weak-
ness. This cryptographic weakness is described more fully in [19].
SAFER (K-64) is a block cipher that operates on 8-byte (64-bit) blocks
under the control of an 8-byte (64-bit) key. It is a byte–oriented cipher
in that all of its basic operations are on bytes or pairs of bytes. Thus we
consider the message space to be a Z256-module of rank 8, V say. SAFER is
an r-round cipher that uses 2r+1 8-byte (64-bit) subkeys K1 · · ·K2r+1. The
key scheduling is such that the jth byte of any subkey depends only on the
jth byte of the key. Thus the subkey bytes are independent. The ith round
function splits naturally into two parts:
1. Keyed Byte–Separated Layer: Each of the 8 bytes is processed sepa-
rately from the other bytes. A byte is obtained from the jth byte using
the jth bytes from subkeys K2i−1 and K2i, 8-bit XOR, addition modulo
256 and a byte function.
2. Pseudo Hadamard Transform (PHT) Layer: This is a module homo-
morphism α of V , so the bytes are mixed linearly. If α has matrix M
with respect to the standard basis, then
22
M =

8 4 4 2 4 2 2 1
4 2 4 2 2 1 2 1
4 2 2 1 4 2 2 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

.
After r rounds there is a final output transformation, for which the jth
byte output depends only on the jth byte input and the jth byte from subkey
K2r+1.
In the likelihood framework we are interested in defining partition func-
tions φi on V which determine a partition on the key space such that the
likelihood function on the key classes is easily calculated and can be used to
find the true key class of the true key. We therefore consider the following
two submodules of V ,
R = 〈 e2 − e5, e3 − e5, e6 − e4, e7 − e4 〉,
S = 〈 e1, e2 + e3 + e5, e4 + e6 + e7, e8 〉,
where ei denotes the element with 1 as its i
th coordinate and 0 everywhere
else. Now V = R ⊕ S, and R and S are α-invariant submodules of rank 4.
We thus define partion functions to be the module homomorphisms φi : V →
R ∼= V/S, which are defined by the matrix
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 −1 −1
−1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0

with respect to the standard basis. The class of an element v ∈ V is its
“projection” onto the submodule R.
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We now consider the effect of the ith round function on the classes. For
an input in a given class to the keyed byte–separated layer, the probability
of an output class is independent of the 1st and 8th bytes of subkey K2i−1
and K2i as neither e1 nor e8 is included in any of the basis elements of R.
Thus the output class of the keyed byte–separated layer is independent of
the 1st and 8th bytes of the key. The PHT layer permutes the classes as R
is an α-invariant subspace. Therefore the transition probability from any
input class to the ith round to any output class is independent of the 1st
and 8th bytes of the key. By using this argument iteratively (and handling
the final output transformation similarly), we have shown that the transition
probability from plaintext class to ciphertext class is independent of the 1st
and 8th bytes of the key. In the language of Section 7, we have found a
probabilistic algebraic structure.
We can therefore define a key partition function σ : K = Z8256 → Z6256 on
the key space K by
(k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6, k7, k8)σ = (k2, k3, k4, k5, k6, k7).
For plaintext class x and ciphertext class y, the log–likelihood function is
given by
L[(x, y); k] = L[(x, y); σ(k)] for all k.
There are 248 key classes and so at most 248 evaluations of the log–likelihood
function. Thus if there are any non–negligible correlations between plaintext
and ciphertext classes we have a reduced key search. A detailed analysis
is given in [19]. In any case, we have given partitions of the plaintext and
ciphertext spaces which are independent of a quarter of the key bits.
Shannon’s principle of confusion [22], which is “to make the relationship
between simple statistics of the ciphertext and simple statistics of the key
a very complex and involved one”, is one of SAFER’s design criteria [14].
Our analysis of SAFER in the likelihood framework has given partitions of
the plaintext and ciphertext spaces which are independent of a quarter of
the key bits. We have thus exposed a cryptographic weakness of the SAFER
algorithm and shown that it does not satisfy one of its own design criteria.
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